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1 Introduction 
Th e separation of ownership and control is a phenomenon 
that can explain the incidence of CEO turnover. Due to 
the separation managers become the administrators of 
the shareholders’ wealth. In the process, both parties 
– managers and owners – want to maximise their 
interests, therefore expropriation of the CEO position is 
not rare. One powerful weapon in the hands of owners in 
this situation is the threat of CEO dismissal. Th erefore, 
relation between company performance and management 
turnover is expected to be inverse (Warner et. al, 1988; 
Weisbach, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Marphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993; Denis and Denis, 1995; Lausten, 
2000; Brunello et.al, 2000; Kaplan, 1994 a,b; Kiang and 
Shivadasani, 1995; Renneboog, 2000 etc.). In order to 
practice this threat an owner can use diff erent corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
 One of the internal corporate governance mechanisms 
that can be used are ownership structure, concentration 
and change. Denis et al. (1997) believed that the possibility 
of executive managers’ turnover is positively related to 
the presence of external owners. On the contrary, Jensen 
(1993) claimed that managerial shareholding helps align 
the interests of shareholders and managers (principals and 
agents). Berle and Means (1932) claimed that controlling 
block holders are more effi  cient monitors of a company’s 
performance than a large number of shareholders. So, the 
probability of turnover in poorly performing companies 
in the case of concentrated ownership is higher and 
opposite. An ownership change is usually connected 
with management turnover. In these cases, there is a 
higher probability that the management turnover is not 
connected with the poor performance of the company 
but is instead caused by an ownership change (hostile or 
friendly takeover). Empirical researches (Holderness and 
Sheeham, 1985; Barclay and Holderness, 1991) have shown 
that the probability of management turnover is higher 
aft er a company has been taken over by a new owner. 
 Research results on the sample of Slovenian companies 
showed that external owners (funds and other companies) 
are not better principals than insider owners (employees 
and managers). Further, ownership concentration is not 
identifi ed as an effi  cient corporate governance mechanism. 
Th erefore, concentration does not improve the effi  ciency 
of monitoring control. Opposite ownership change is 
an effi  cient corporate governance mechanism used for 
disciplining poorly performing managers. 
Influence of the Company Performance and 
Ownership Structure on CEO Turnover: 
the Evidence of Slovenia 
Ljubica Knežević Cvelbar
Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana, Kardeljeva ploščad 17, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia,  ljubica.knezevic@ef.uni-lj.si 
The goal of the article is to research relation between CEO turnover, company performance ownership structure concentration and 
change.  The empirical evidence presented in the article is based on the sample of 211 Slovenian companies in period 1998-2002. 
As expected the relation between CEO turnover and company performance is inverse. Ownership concentration is not an efficient 
corporate governance mechanism. Opposite change in the ownership structure influence on the management turnover in the poorly 
performing companies. 
Key words: CEO turnover, ownership structure, ownership concentration, ownership change   corporate governance, agency theory 
Vpliv poslovanja podjetij in lastniške strukture na zamenjavo predsednika uprave: Primer Slovenije
Cilj članka je raziskati relacijo med zamenjavo predsednika uprave in uspešnostjo poslovanja podjetij,  lastniško strukturo, koncentracijo 
lastništva ter zamenjavo lastništva. Za empirično testiranje hipotez je bil uporabljen vzorec od 211 slovenskih podjetij v obdobju 
1998-2002. Kot pričakovano rezultati so pokazali, da je relacija med zamenjavo predsednika uprave in poslovanjem podjetij inverzna. 
Koncentracija lastništva ni učinkovit mehanizem vladanja podjetjem. Nasprotno zamenjava lastniške strukture vpliva na zamenjavo 
predsednikov uprav v podjetjih, ki slabo poslujejo. 
Ključne besede: zamenjava predsednika uprave, lastniška struktura, koncentracija lastništva, zamenjava lastništva, vladanje podjetjem, 
teorija agenta
6 Th e rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Th e 
next section briefl y describes empirical evidence on 
turnover performance relation, followed by the fi ndings 
and conclusions of the existing literature regarding the 
infl uence of the ownership structure, concentration and 
change on CEO turnover. Infl uence of management and 
company characteristics on management turnover is 
presented in section four. Data and methodology used are 
described in the section fi ft h. Th e sixth section is dedicated 
to the description of ownership structure and its change 
in Slovenia and CEO characteristics and turnover rates. 
Th e results of the probit regression model researching 
the infl uence of the ownership structure, concentration 
and change on management turnover are presented in the 
section seventh. Discussion on policy implications and 
conclusions are presented in the section eight.   
2 Performance-turnover relation 
Th e sensitivity of top management turnover to fi rm 
performance is usually interpreted as an indication that the 
shareholders hold the CEO responsible for poor corporate 
performance and that they dismiss an underperforming 
CEO in order to increase the corporate value. It is 
commonly reported in the empirical studies that a poor 
corporate performance is associated with CEO turnover.  
 Most of the empirical evidence in developed 
countries on turnover-performance confi rms inverse 
relation between two variables, meaning that shareholders 
are replacing poor performing managers (Warner et. al, 
1988; Weisbach, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Marphy 
and Zimmerman, 1993; Denis and Denis, 1995; Lausten, 
2000; Brunello et.al, 2000; Kaplan, 1994 a,b; Kiang and 
Shivadasani, 1995; Renneboog, 2000 etc.). 
 Empirical evidence in transition countries is scarce. 
Few studies research the turnover – performance relation 
and confi rm that relation is negative. Gibson (2003) 
empirically examines the link between management 
turnover and fi rm performance in eight emerging 
markets and concludes that there is a signifi cant 
negative relationship between management turnover and 
companies performance. Aivazian et al. (2005) reported 
an inverse relationship between management turnover 
and companies’ performance on a sample of incorporated 
Chinese SOEs (state-owned enterprises). For a sample 
of Russian companies, REB Monitoring (2003) found 
that the replacement of top executives is more likely to 
occur in poorly performing companies. Eriksson (2005) 
also provided evidence on management turnover in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics. He found a signifi cant and 
negative relationship between management turnover and 
companies’ performance levels. Frydman, Hessel and 
Rapaczynski (2000) claim that management turnover 
among Czech, Hungarian and Polish companies aff ected 
with the company revenue growth. Th e companies 
in which new managers were appointed had higher 
growth rates. Fidermuc and Fidermuc (2006) analyzed 
management replacement aft er the privatization in Czech 
Republic. Authors showed that company performance 
improved aft er appointing the new manager. On a sample 
of large Ukrainian companies, Warzynski (2001) found 
that management turnover did not eff ect a change in 
productivity in state-owned enterprises but had a small 
and positive eff ect in privatised companies. 
3  Ownership characteristics as a 
corporate governance mechanism 
controlling management turnover 
Th ree ownership characteristics infl uence on CEO 
turnover: ownership identity, ownership concentration 
and ownership change. 
 Th eoretical and empirical evidence researching 
relation between ownership identity and CEO turnover 
mainly focus on the proportion of insiders and outsiders 
owners. Concerning Jensen’s hypothesis on the convergence 
of interest, managerial shareholding helps align the 
interests of shareholders and managers (principals and 
agents). With regard to this hypothesis, as the proportion 
of managerial equity grows the company’s performance 
improves as well (Jensen, 1993). De Angelo and De Angelo 
(1985) also found that it is reasonable for owners to motivate 
the managers to invest in the company and share their 
faith with other company shareholders. On the other side, 
managerial ownership lowers the probability of replacing 
management which becomes a problem if poor managers 
are appointed. Further, managerial ownership can inhibit 
the external control market, reduce the eff ectiveness of 
internal control and reduce the probability of receiving 
a takeover bid. Th erefore, managerial ownership can be 
referred to as good if there is a successful manager in the 
position and ‘too much of a good thing’ if poor performing 
managers are appointed. 
 Evidence of the infl uence of managerial ownership on 
the turnover-performance relationship is mostly limited 
to US practice. On a sample of American companies, 
Weisbach (1988) did not fi nd evidence that having a 
top executive shareholding reduces the probability of 
turnover. Morck et al. (1988) claimed that boards with 
signifi cant managerial ownership are more likely to 
behave in the interests of shareholders due to the fact they 
are owners. On the other hand, Denis et al. (1997) found 
that management turnover is signifi cantly less sensitive 
to performance when managers hold 5 to 25 percent of 
ownership shares than when directors hold less than 5 
percent of the shares, meaning there is lower possibility 
of a poor performing manager being replaced if they hold 
higher ownership shares in the company. Mikelson and 
Partch (1996) also found a negative relationship between 
management turnover and management ownership of a 
company. UK practice shows that managerial ownership 
reduces the probability of management turnover (Dahya, 
1988; Dedman, 2003; Conyon and Florou, 2002). 
 Parrino et al. (2003) and Denis et al. (1997) focus 
on institutional investors and their infl uence on CEO 
turnover and found that institutional investors positively 
aff ects the probability of top executive turnover due to 
poor performance. 
Brunello et al. (2003) on the sample of Italian companies 
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found that presence of the CEO as a controlling shareholder 
increases the sensitivity of turnover to performance. Voplin 
(2002) drew a diff erent conclusion on a sample of Italian 
companies. In Russia, inside ownership exerts a negative 
impact on management turnover probability while 
outside ownership has a positive one (REB Monitoring, 
2003). In the case of Danish companies Lausten (2002) 
proved that family ownership can cause poor corporate 
governance. On the contrary, the presence of foreign and 
other domestic companies raise the probability of a poorly 
performing manager’s turnover. Ronneboog (2000) found 
that neither large institutional investors (banks, investment 
funds and insurance companies) nor holding companies 
seem to be involved in active corporate monitoring. In 
contrast, management replacement is infl uenced by large 
industrial investors and blocks held by families, however 
not signifi cantly. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) in a case of 
Japanese companies indicated that the relationship between 
turnover and performance is signifi cantly stronger for a 
fi rm tied to a main bank or a member of a keiretsu. On the 
other hand, Kaplan (1994a) did not confi rm that banks or 
large block holders increase the probability of a Japanese 
management turnover in the case of a poor performance. 
 Concentrated ownership should provide effi  cient 
management control, the maximisation of shareholders’ 
interests and the availability of external sources for 
fi nancing the company (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Bearle 
and Means (1932) claim that controlling block holders are 
more effi  cient monitors of a company’s performance than a 
large number of minority stockholders. So the probability 
of turnover should be higher in the case of concentrated 
ownership. However, little empirical evidence confi rms 
this hypothesis. For instance, the Belgian corporate 
governance system is characterised by high ownership 
concentration yet Renneboog (2000) showed there is 
scant evidence about the corporate control role of large 
shareholders. As expected, empirical evidence from the 
UK and the US does not support this hypothesis (Franks 
et al., 2001; Ronneboog and Trojanowski, 2003; Denis 
and Denis , 1995; Franks and Mayers, 2001). Opposite 
Voplin (2002) on a sample of Italian companies recorded 
a more sensitive turnover-performance relationship due to 
ownership concentration. 
 An ownership change is usually connected with 
management turnover especially in the case of poorly 
performing company (Holderness et al., 1985; Barclay 
et al., 1991, Franks et al., 2001, Wayne and Megan, 1997; 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1997). Th e same evidence can be 
recorded in developing countries (REB Monitoring, 2003; 
Gibson, 2003).  
4  Management and company 
characteristics 
Besides the stated corporate governance mechanisms, 
management and company characteristics’ impact on the 
probability of management turnover will be tested. Within 
management’s characteristics, management tenure and 
age have mostly been used in the empirical studies so far 
(Kaplan, 1994 a,b; Franks et al., 2001; Kang and Shidasani, 
1995; Lausten, 2001; Gibson, 2003; Suchard et al., 2001; 
Brunello et al., 2003). It is shown that older management 
with a higher tenure has a greater probability of being 
replaced. 
 Company size is the mostly used measure for testing 
the infl uence of company characteristics on management 
turnover (Conyon and Nicolitsas, 1998; Cosh and Hughes, 
1997; Lausten, 2002; Suchard et al. 2001; Eriksson, 2005; 
Zhou, 2000; Warner et al., 1988). Empirical evidence is 
inconsistent when explaining the infl uence of company size 
on management turnover. Some research has found that the 
probability of management turnover in larger companies, 
while others claim the opposite. Th is hypothesis will be 
tested in the case of Slovenia.  
 Last but not least, fi nancial leverage can infl uence 
management turnover (Hart, 1995; Hotchkiss, 1995; 
Franks et al., 2001; Renneboog, 2000). Creditors’ power 
to infl uence the business decisions of the company arises 
from the many controllers’ rights belonging to them when 
the company does not fulfi l all of its responsibilities. High 
business risk and low liquidity raise the probability of a 
company going into bankruptcy, which ultimately leads to 
management turnover. Whether higher fi nancial leverage 
increases the probability of management turnover in 
Slovenian companies will also be investigated in this 
article.
5 Hypothesis, data and methodology
Hypotheses tested within this article are listed below: 
H.1:     Th e relationship between CEO turnover and company 
performance is expected to be inverse. 
H.2:  A higher proportion of ownership controlled by 
outsiders (funds and other companies) increases 
the probability of a management turnover in poorly 
performing companies.
H.3:   Outsiders as controlling shareholders increase the 
probability of a management turnover in poorly 
performing companies. 
H.4:  An ownership change positively infl uences a 
management turnover in poorly performing 
companies.
H.5:  Older and management board members with higher 
tenure decrease the probability of CEO turnover. 
H.6:   Company size infl uences the probability of CEO 
turnover. 
H.7:   Th e higher the fi nancial leverage the higher the 
probability of a CEO turnover. 
 In order to test infl uence of the corporate governance 
mechanisms and company performance on management 
turnover, primary and secondary data sources were used. 
 Primary data used for this research were collected 
within quantitative research performed by the Institute for 
South-East Europe (ISEE)1. Th e research took place in the 
period from May to September 2003. Th e fi rst step within 
1 Th e research was conducted within the project ‘Regional Th ink Tank Partnership Project’ and was fi nanced by the IRIS.
8the research was the preparation of the questionnaire, which 
was the addressed to Slovenian fi rms. Th e questionnaire 
was composed of fi ve parts: corporate governance system 
characteristics; management characteristics; companies’ 
core competences; fi nancing issues; and research and 
development.  For the purpose of the analysis presented in 
this paper the questions from the fi rst two parts addressed 
in the questionnaire, namely corporate governance 
system and management characteristics, were used. Th e 
questionnaire was mailed to 623 Slovenian companies. 211 
questionnaires were returned. Th e high response rate of 
34 percent was the result of a few months’ work. Th e main 
database is structured as an unbalanced panel dataset 
collected from the questionnaires addressed to the fi rms.2 
Data were collected for the period 1998-2002.
 Secondary data sources on fi nancial data. Financial 
reports were available from the Agency of the Republic of 
Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services. 
Th e Agency keeps records for all joint-stock and limited 
companies that are not fi nancial institutions. Th ere 
are approximately 37,000 legal entities in the Agency’s 
register. Financial reports consist of balance sheets and 
income statements as well as information on a company’s 
main activity, main offi  ce location, number of employees 
etc. Th ose data were used to compose a second database 
containing balance sheet and income statement data for 
the 211 fi rms in our sample, namely companies that co-
operated in the research.
 Most companies (81 percent) in the sample are 
registered as joint-stock companies. Th e interviewed 
companies represented 19.5 percent of the sales and assets 
of all Slovenian companies and employed 20.1 percent of 
all employees in 2002. Th e average number of employees 
in the companies in the sample varies through the years 
from 458 to 496 (the standard deviations are very high). If 
companies are classifi ed with regard to the classifi cation 
recommended by the Companies Act from 1993, the 
sample was composed of 10.7 percent of small companies3, 
75.8 percent of medium-sized companies4 and 13.5 percent 
of large companies5. Financial indicators showed that, on 
average, total company sales grew from 7.2 to 11.5 percent 
on the yearly level. Th e return on assets (ROA) in the 
observed period was between 9.4 and 11 percent, while the 
return on equity (ROE) was between 4.1 and 5.3 percent. 
Th e companies in the sample had a debt-to-assets ratio of 
around 40 percent.
 To examine the impact of company performance 
and corporate governance mechanisms on management 
turnover, the Logit, Probit or Tobit regression models have 
been employed in most of the empirical studies conducted 
so far. To examine the impact of the company performance 
and ownership characteristics on CEO turnover in 
Slovenia, a Probit regression model was employed: 
P(CEO turnover) = f(β1 + β2X (Performance measures variables) + β3X 
(Ownership identity,  ownership concentration, ownership change) + β4X (Management 
characteristics variables) + β5X  (Company characteristic variable and Financial leverage) 
+ ε 
In order to test the relationship between turnover and 
performance two accounting measures of performance 
were used. Market measures of performance were not 
used since all companies in the sample were not listed6 
on the Ljubljana Stock Exchange. Current (in year t) and 
lagged performance values (in year t-1 and t-2) were used 
in the regression analysis. All performance measures were 
available for the period 1998-2002. Th e fi rst measure of 
performance used is sales growth. Th e second measure 
of performance used in the regression is return on assets 
(ROA)7. Th e both performance measures were adjusted for 
the industry average8. 
Data on owners’ identity were collected within the 
primary research. For regression analysis, state and 
investment fund ownership shares were combined within 
one variable: ownership of funds, domestic and foreign 
companies’ shares in one variable: company ownership 
and employees and management ownership shares in one 
variable: internal ownership. Th e reference group was the 
ownership shares of bank, state and minority shareholders. 
Ownership share data were used to form dummy variables 
representing the ownership concentration in the hands of 
a specifi c group of owners. Namely, the dummy variable 
took the value of 1 if a specifi c owner holds controlling 
shareholdings in the company (an ownership share higher 
than 50 percent) and 0 if it does not. Dummy variables were 
also used for ownership change. If the tracked ownership 
change was 10 percent or higher then dummies variables 
took the value of 1, and the value of 0 otherwise. I took 10 
percent as a threshold value due to the fact that an owner 
gains substantial power in a company’s decision-making 
process if he increases his ownership share by 10 or more 
percent (an increase in shareholding for example by 1 or 
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2  Th e panel is unbalanced, there are some missing values for diff erent reasons (e.g. the company was established aft er 1998), so the actual number of 
observations diff ers from analysis to analysis.
3   A small company has: average number of employees up to 50; average annual income up to SIT 200 million (EUR 834,585) and average assets value up 
to SIT 100 million (EUR 417,292). 
4  Medium company has: average number of employees from 51 to 250, average annual income from SIT 200 million (EUR 834,585) up to SIT 800 million 
(EUR 3.34 million) and an average value of assets from SIT 100 million (EUR 417,292) to SIT 400 million (EUR 1.67 million).
5  Large companies are companies which have at least two criteria higher than those companies classifi ed as medium sized (more than 251 employees, 
average annual income higher than SIT 800 million (EUR 3.34 million) and an average value of assets higher than SIT 400 million (EUR 1.67 million). 
6 42 out of 211 companies from the sample are not listed on the Ljubljana Stock Exchange. 
7 ROA is defi ned as the ratio between EBIT related to fi rm total assets.
8  Newly created performance measures represent company performance plus the diff erence in company performance and the industry average (for 
example, DTSti+(DTSti-DTSt). Using industry-adjusted variables company performance was adjusted for the industry average. For example, if the 
whole industry performed poorly, by adjusting company performance for industry average, the company results would be improved. Industry-adjusted 
variables for testing turnover performance relationship were also used by Dahya et al. (2002); Kang and Shivdasani (1995); Denis and Denis (1995); 
Renneboorg (2000); Brunello et al. (2003). 
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2 percent does not increase the owner’s decision-making 
power substantially). In order to relate ownership identity, 
concentration and change with company performance an 
additional set of variables was created. Namely, ownership 
characteristic variables were interacted with performance 
measures: total sales growth and return on assets (values 
at moment t). 
6 Ownership structure in Slovenia 
Privatisation gave an important role to the insiders 
(employees and managers) and funds (state and investment) 
in the process of governing Slovenian companies. However, 
the ownership structure changed aft er the privatisation 
and is still in the process of transformation. Data on the 
ownership structure in Slovenian companies were collected 
during quantitative research for the period 1998-2003. In 
the observed period on a sample of 211 companies the most 
important individual owners were domestic and foreign 
companies, employees9 and investment funds controlling 
on average 22.9 20.1 and 15.4 percent of the ownership, 
respectively. State funds owned on average 12.4 percent 
of the shares, while banks held on average 1.7 percent. 
Management10 and minority shareholders held on average 
approximately the same ownership shares, amounting 
to 3 percent. Th e trends show an increase in the average 
ownership shares in the hands of domestic and foreign 
non-fi nancial companies. On the contrary, the average 
ownership shares controlled by state funds, investment 
funds and employees are decreasing11 (Table 1). 
 Th e results point to the conclusion that employees’ 
and state funds’ ownership ‘created’ during and aft er 
privatisation has been spilling over into the hands of 
managers and non-fi nancial domestic companies. Ribnikar 
(1995) believed that the ownership share of employees is 
decreasing due to the short-term orientation of employees 
as owners. ‘Employees will be prepared to sell shares at 
the moment, when they will receive more for it, than they 
had paid’ (Ribnikar, 1995). Many authors claim that the 
reduction of the ownership controlled by state funds is 
highly important. Simoneti et al. (2005) claimed that the 
artifi cially made state funds were the transitional owners 
of the companies’ shares and they showed themselves to 
be good sellers of their ownership to ‘fi nal’ owners. Pahor 
et al. (2003) reported that the transformation of state and 
investment funds is highly important for achieving a 
normal market-oriented economy with a reduced political 
infl uence on business. Domadenik (2003) shared their 
opinion. Based on the above, it is expected that state funds 
will continue to decrease their ownership and thus the 
state’s infl uence on the economy. Th e trend of increasing 
ownership held by other domestic non-fi nancial companies 
will continue, while it is to be expected that foreign 
companies will raise their ownership in the future. 
 Ownership concentration in Slovenian companies 
remained low and in 1998 half of the fi rms listed on the 
Ljubljana Stock Exchange did not have an owner holding 
more than 20 percent of the voting rights, while the 
concentration of ownership and control was slightly higher 
in the case of non-listed companies (Gregorič, 2003). Th e 
trends showing the increasing concentration of ownership 
among Slovenian companies. Based on data obtained 
from the offi  cial Shareholders’ Register kept and updated 
by the Central Clearing Securities Corporation, the largest 
owner (C1) in 211 companies in the 1998-01 period had 
an average share of 35 percent, the second largest owner 
has 14 and the third 8 percent, while the top fi ve owners 
(C5) had on average 61 percent of the ownership shares 
(Knežević Cvelbar, 2006). 
7 CEO turnover rates in Slovenia 
Th e average CEO turnover rate, calculated on a sample 
of 211 Slovenian companies in the 1998-02 period was 
5.97 percent. Th e CEO turnover rate is calculated as 
the percentage of changed CEOs in the total number of 
observations from the sample. Th is fi gure is lower than 
that recorded in developed countries. For example, the 
CEO turnover rate in the US varies from 18.3 percent 
(Warner et al., 1988) to 7.8 percent (Weisbach, 1988), in 
the UK between 13.6 percent (Franks et al., 2001) and 7.71 
percent (Dahya et al., 2002) etc. 
 Table 2 reveals that the CEO turnover rate in Slovenia 
diff ers over the observed period. An analysis of variance 
showed signifi cant diff erences between the turnover rates 
in 2001 and 2002 in comparison to other observed years. 
CEO turnover rates in 2001 and 2002 moved closer to the 
developed countries’ average and amounted to 9.5 and 8.5 
percent, respectively. On the other side, CEO turnover 
rates in the 1997-2000 period were signifi cantly lower 
and on average amounted to 3 to 4 percent. It is hard to 
explain why the CEO turnover rates were lower in 1997-
2000 than aft er 2000. Th e changing ownership structure 
could be one reason. Namely, aft er privatisation the 
artifi cial owners were gradually replaced with more active 
ones. Th e replacement or even retirement of the ‘old boys’ 
who came into their positions aft er privatisation might 
be an additional reason for the higher turnover rates in 
2001 and 2002. Another reason for the higher turnover 
rates recorded aft er 2000 could be the change of four-year 
mandate for CEOs taking up their positions in 1996 (aft er 
privatisation). Th e main limitation of the results presented 
here is that the data do not distinguish the reason for 
turnover. Th erefore, the reported CEO turnover rate could 
be biased upwards due to the fact that unforced turnovers 
are included in the reported turnover rate.  As presented 
in the table 2 below on average, the Slovenian CEO has 
held their position for 6.7 years and on average CEO has 
  9 Th is group includes: employees, former employees, retired persons and their relatives.
10  Th is group includes: managers – top, middle, low managers. 
11  Th ese fi ndings support the research results of Prašnikar et al. (2000), Gregorič and Prašnikar (2002), Damijan et al. (2003) and Simoneti and Gregorič 
(2004).  
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been working for 11 years in the company. Th e last CEO 
characteristic observed was the CEO’s age. On average, the 
Slovenian CEO is 48 years old. 
8 Results 
Th e fi rst question is whether a turnover is related to a poor 
company performance. Th e article investigate whether 
disciplining takes place at an early stage (rapidly aft er a 
sales growth decrease) or later when a company has been 
generating low or negative sales growth rates for a few 
years. Th e inclusion of lagged performance up to two years 
aft er a turnover allows me to investigate the reaction time 
of Management Board restructuring. 
 As shown in Table 3 in the case of non-fi nancial 
Slovenian companies there is a negative and signifi cant 
relationship between CEO turnover and both performance 
measures. A signifi cant and negative relationship was 
recorded between current sales growth and CEO turnover, 
while a signifi cant and negative relationship was recorded 
between CEO turnover and the lagged return on assets. 
Both total sales growth and industry-adjusted sales growth 
rates showed there is a higher probability of a CEO being 
replaced if the sales volume drops in the current year. On 
the contrary, there is a higher probability of the CEO being 
replaced if ROA and industry-adjusted ROA were negative 
two years before the turnover. Th erefore, the evidence 
presented in Table 3 fails to reject hypothesis H1 and 
shows that the poorer the performance the higher is the 
probability of a CEO turnover. 
 Th e Probit regression presented in Table 3 also 
investigates whether the ownership structure plays a 
performance-induced disciplining role. Regression 
results showed that all of the ownership categories seem 
to be involved in disciplinary actions against the CEO 
when performance is poor. Variables explaining the 
interactions between company performance (sale growth) 
and the owners’ identity were negative and signifi cant. 
On the other side, variables representing the interaction 
between ownership shares and ROA were negative but not 
signifi cant12. Based on these results hypothesis H.2 stating 
that management turnover due to poor performance falls 
along with increasing ownership shares of insiders has to 
be rejected. Th e results point out that insiders are just as 
good as monitors as outsiders. 
 High leverage encourages management to generate 
suffi  cient funds to service the debt. Th erefore, a high 
debt-assets ratio is expected to reduce management’s 
discretion and call for more intensive creditor monitoring. 
Management turnover is expected to be positively correlated 
with high fi nancial leverage. On the sample of Slovenian 
non-fi nancial companies hypothesis H7 thus has to be 
rejected. Th e relationship between the debt-to-assets ratio 
and CEO turnover is signifi cant and negative, meaning 
that a higher debt-to-assets ratio decreases the probability 
of a CEO turnover. Th is result can be explained by the fact 
that banks are crediting successful companies (Knežević 
Cvelbar, 2006)13. Th e next determinate included in the 
regression is company size. Regression results showed that 
the size of the company does not aff ect CEO turnover in 
Slovenia, therefore hypothesis H.6 can be rejected. 
Year CEO turnover rate (%) CEO tenure 
CEO years in 
company *** CEO age 
1997 4.3**(2.0)
4.6*** 
(6)
9.0*** 
(9.7)
46.0***
(7.1)
1998 3.3** (1.7)
5.2*** 
(6.3)
9.7***
 (10.0)
46.0***
(6.7)
1999 4.3**(2.0)
5.9*** 
(6.6)
10.4*** 
(10.3)
47.0***
(7.4)
2000 4.3**(2.0)
6.6*** 
(6.9)
11.1***
 (10.6)
48.0***
(7.6)
2001 9.5**(2.9)
7.3*** 
(7.1)
11.8*** 
(10.9)
48.8***
(7.7)
2002 8.5**(2.8)
8.2*** 
(7.3)
12.7*** 
(11)
49.2***
(7.5)
1998-2002 5.9(2.3)
6.7 
(6.9)
11.2
(10.6)
47.9
(7.5)
Source: questionnaire data and own calculations
  ** diff erences between the groups were signifi cant at the 5% level  (One-way Anova; Method: Duncan)
*** diff erences between the groups were signifi cant at the 1% level (One-way Anova; Method: Duncan)
Table 2: CEO turnover rates and characteristics in the 1997-2002 period
 12  An exception was the negative relationship recorded between CEO turnover and ownership shares in the hands of insiders, meaning there is a higher 
probability of the CEO being replaced if an ownership share in the hands of insider owners’ increases and the company is recording a negative return 
on assets. 
13  Knežević Cvelbar (2006) performed Factor and Cluster analysis. Companies were divided in three groups. Results showed that companies that belong 
to the group of »the most successful companies« had higher debt to assets ratio. Th is result could be explained with the fact that Slovenian banks have 
restrictive bank policies.
12
 Th e last group of independent variables included 
in the Probit regression model are management 
characteristics. CEO characteristics could not be 
included in the model since data on CEO turnover are 
truncated variables based on CEO tenure, meaning 
that we collected data on current CEO characteristics. 
Instead, CEO characteristics, board members’ tenure, 
age and turnover were incorporated in the model. As 
presented in Table 3, all Management Board members’ 
characteristics variables are signifi cant. Th e regression 
results showed that the longer Management Board 
members have held their position and the older they are 
there is a lower probability of a CEO turnover. Th is result 
can be explained by the fact that companies frequently 
appoint an insider as a new CEO.  A dummy variable 
representing the other board members turnover was 
included in the models. Th e results showed a positive 
relationship between CEO turnover and Management 
Board member turnover. Th is result may indicate that 
the Supervisory Board usually gives its trust in the whole 
Management Board and replacing one of the board 
members raises the probability of replacing the others. 
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TOTAL SALES 
GROWTH (DTS)
 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
(ROA)
 
INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED DTS
 
INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED ROA
 
VARIABLE 
Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z|
Obs. N. 392 504 392 514
1. Intercept -0.263 0.793 0.4644 0.511 -0.1313 0.894 0.1649 0.811
Perfor mance
2. Performance t -6.202** 0.034 2.4713 0.344 -2.7034** 0.026 -0.8633 0.583
3. Performance t-1 -0.120 0.805 -0.5832 0.474 0.0866 0.728 -0.3382 0.413
4. Performance t-2 -0.142 0.738 -1.4079* 0.059 -0.0226 0.917 -0.6422* 0.085
Ownership ide nt ity  (%)
5. Funds 0.007 0.358 0.0023 0.708 0.0064 0.374 0.0008 0.888
6. Other companies 0.005 0.468 0.0006 0.899 0.0046 0.479 0.0008 0.865
7. Internal -0.006 0.539 -0.0127 0.103 -0.0059 0.522 -0.0078 0.289
Inter action be twe en ownersh ip sh are (%)  and performance at t  
8. Funds -0.085** 0.019 0.0347 0.617 -0.0757** 0.013 0.0124 0.736
9. Other companies -0.091** 0.021 0.0293 0.336 -0.0791** 0.019 0.0090 0.594
10. Internal  -0.155*** 0.001 -0.0806*** 0.000 -0.1456*** 0.000 0.0107 0.814
Financial  Le verage
11.DA -1.106** 0.043 -1.1353*** 0.010 -1.0192** 0.050 -0.8463** 0.053
Firm char acter istic
12. Employee num 0.000 0.781 -0.0001 0.560 0.0001 0.599 -0.0001 0.536
Manage ment  char acte ristics
13. MBM tenure -0.108*** 0.000 -0.0748*** 0.001 -0.1085*** 0.000 -0.0733*** 0.001
14. MBM age -0.031*** 0.007 -0.0293*** 0.004 -0.0306*** 0.008 -0.0275*** 0.005
15. MBM turnover 0.324* 0.100 0.3523** 0.041 0.3080 0.131 0.3936** 0.017
Prob›  chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Pseudo R 2 0.2999 0.1905 0.3029 0.1855
Table 3: Probit regression on CEO turnover – ownership identity 
     * coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 10% level; 
  ** coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 5% level ; 
*** coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. 
Source: questionnaire data and own calculations
 In line with the theory, large shareholdings controlled 
by a single owner should improve monitoring and reduce 
agency costs. On the sample of Slovenian non-fi nancial 
companies’ hypothesis H.3 was rejected. Th e regression 
results indicate that in successful companies in which other 
companies hold controlling shareholdings the probability 
of replacing the CEO is signifi cantly higher than if internal 
owners have controlling shareholdings. On the contrary, 
the probability of CEO turnover in poorly performing 
companies in which funds are controlling owners is not 
signifi cantly greater compared to companies controlled by 
internal owners. Th is would mean that poor performance 
and the existence of a controlling outsider owner do not 
increase the probability of a CEO turnover. Th ese results 
indicate that ownership concentration does not improve 
the effi  ciency of the corporate governance system. Other 
independent variables had the same infl uence on CEO 
turnover as in the previous regression (Table 4). 
 Increasing the ownership shares in the hands of a 
specifi c owner could boost the probability of a management 
turnover. Regression results testing how ownership 
changes infl uence CEO turnover in Slovenia are presented 
in Table 5. An increase in ownership controlled by funds 
and other companies are defi ned as dummy variables, 
while an increase of insider ownership is defi ned as a 
reference variable. Results of the Probit regression indicate 
that an ownership change does not signifi cantly increase 
the probability of a CEO turnover. Variables representing 
the interaction between an ownership change and current 
performance were also included in the model. Th e results 
showed there is a higher probability that a CEO will be 
replaced if other companies increased they ownership 
shares (by 10 percent or more) in poorly performing 
companies (sales growth is decreasing) than where internal 
owners were to increase their ownership holdings. On the 
contrary, there is no signifi cant diff erence in the probability 
of a CEO turnover if funds increase their ownership 
shares. Th ese results indicate that the probability of a CEO 
turnover in poorly performing companies will rise if other 
companies increase their ownership shares. Th erefore, 
hypothesis H.4 cannot be rejected if other companies are 
increasing their ownership share. Th ese results indicate 
that managers in successful companies have a higher 
probability of remaining in their position when other 
companies increase their ownership shares (Table 5). 
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9 Conclusions 
Th e Slovenian corporate governance system is closer to 
the insider than the outside corporate governance model 
(Gregorič, 2003). A relatively low ownership concentration 
(the largest shareholder controls 35 percent of ownership 
shares), the increasing ownership shares in the hands 
of non-fi nancial domestic companies and managers, 
decreasing ownership held by employees, gradual selling 
off  of the ownership controlled by state funds, the low level 
of interference of foreign non-fi nancial companies are 
just some of the characteristics of the Slovenian corporate 
governance system (Gregorič, 2003; Prašnikar and 
Gregorič, 2002; Domadenik, 2003; Pahor, 2003; Knežević 
Cvelbar, 2006). 
 Research results showed that external owners (funds 
and other companies) are not better principals than 
insider owners (employees and managers). Th e results 
did not prove that insiders, employees and managers 
are protecting CEOs interest when performance is poor. 
It appears that funds, other companies and insiders 
are involved in disciplinary action against the CEO 
when performance is poor. Ownership concentration 
 
TOTAL SALES 
GROWTH (DTS)
 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
(ROA)
 
INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED DTS 
 
INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED ROA 
 
VARIABLE 
Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z|
Obs. N. 386 505 385 504
Perfor mance
1. Intercept 0.0944 0.876 0.0646 0.900 -0.0085 0.989 -0.1575 0.754
2. Performance t -3.1817*** 0.004 -2.1285 0.217 -1.5076*** 0.003 -0.2559 0.555
3. Performance t-1 0.2446 0.637 -0.7399 0.364 0.1354 0.595 -0.3790 0.345
4. Performance t-2 -0.2585 0.574 -1.4782** 0.047 -0.1038 0.644 -0.7379** 0.052
Ownership conce ntr ation du mmy 
5. Funds 0.2576 0.411 0.2401 0.394 0.3565 0.250 0.4306 0.112
6. Companies  0.2490 0.382 0.3026 0.207 0.3770 0.178 0.4761** 0.052
Inter action be twe en ownersh ip concentr ation du mmy and per for mance at t 
7. Funds  1.6277 0.248 4.1129 0.321 0.8256 0.217 1.8693 0.366
8. Companies 2.4230* 0.079 2.1156 0.285 1.1713* 0.073 6.1991* 0.060
Financial  Le verage
9.DA -0.7865 0.111 -0.8286** 0.052 -0.8152* 0.098 -0.8846** 0.039
Firm char acter istic
10. Employee num -0.0004 0.134 -0.0003* 0.100 -0.0004 0.121 -0.0003 0.166
Manage ment  char acte ristics
11.  MBM tenure -0.0940*** 0.000 -0.0735*** 0.001 -0.0933*** 0.000 -0.0773*** 0.001
12. MBM age -0.0279*** 0.008 -0.0254*** 0.009 -0.0284*** 0.007 -0.0253*** 0.011
13. MBM turnover 0.3663** 0.051 0.4150** 0.014 0.3734** 0.048 0.4026*** 0.020
Prob›  chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R 2 0.2540 0.1962 0.2495 0.1996
Table 4: Probit regression on CEO turnover – ownership concentration 
    * coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 10% level;  
  ** coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 5% level; 
*** coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. 
Source: questionnaire data and own calculations
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was not identifi ed as an effi  cient corporate governance 
mechanism. Regression results indicate that ownership 
concentration increase the probability of a CEO turnover, 
however it does not discipline poorly performing CEOs. 
Th erefore, concentration does not improve the effi  ciency of 
monitoring control. Th is might be the case since ownership 
concentration is lower in Slovenia in comparison with other 
continental European countries and the largest owners do 
not have a controlling ownership share. Ownership change 
is an effi  cient corporate governance mechanism used for 
disciplining poorly performing CEOs. Th e research results 
showed in companies that recorded poor performance, 
an increase of ownership (by 10 percent or more) in the 
hands of other companies increases the probability of 
CEO turnover. Th ese results point out that the increasing 
of ownership shares controlled by other companies plays a 
disciplining role in the process of CEO turnover. 
 Th ere is a higher probability of a board member 
turnover if the CEO is replaced. Th is can lead to the 
conclusion that a management board member’s career 
is linked to that of the CEO. A signifi cant and negative 
relationship was recorded when relating CEO turnover to 
board member age and tenure, indicating there is a lower 
probability of the CEO being replaced if board members 
are older and have held their position longer. Th is may lead 
to the conclusion that CEOs in Slovenian companies are 
being replaced by insiders. 
 Financial leverage has a negative relationship with 
CEO turnover, indicating that the CEO in those companies 
with a lower debt-to-assets ratio has a higher probability of 
being replaced. Th is result is an indication that Slovenian 
banks are fi nancing more successful companies (Knežević 
Cvelbar, 2006). 
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TOTAL SALES 
GROWTH (DTS)
 
RETURN ON 
ASSETS (ROA)
 
INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED DTS 
 
INDUSTRY-
ADJUSTED ROA 
Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z| Par. est P >|z|
Obs. N. 384 487 384 487
Perfor mance
1. Intercept 0.4463 0.488 0.4137 0.510 0.4044 0.522 0.2887 0.606
2. Performance t -0.7554 0.187 -0.1762 0.790 -0.3464 0.209 -0.0102 0.975
3. Performance t-1 0.1812 0.693 -0.9663 0.191 0.1084 0.622 -0.4088 0.280
4. Performance t-2 -0.6554 0.145 -1.8030** 0.026 -0.2982 0.179 -0.8327** 0.044
Ownership ch ange   du mmy
5. Funds -0.0538 0.921 -0.7634 0.279 -0.2226 0.679 -0.4116 0.412
6. Companies -0.2652 0.415 0.1871 0.435 -0.5843* 0.094 0.1516 0.503
Inter action be twe en ownersh ip ch ange  dummy and  performance  at  t  
7. Funds -3.5674 0.176 1.4751 0.112 -1.5595 0.237 7.1189 0.111
8. Companies -7.5267*** 0.000 -1.0746 0.594 -3.4593*** 0.000 -0.3702 0.705
Supervisor y Board  composi tion (du mmy)  and  size
9. SB size  0.0593 0.296 0.0321 0.541 0.0548 0.335 0.0257 0.626
10. SB external 0.632** 0.013 0.5447** 0.017 0.5902** 0.020 0.5228** 0.021
Financial  Le verage
11.DA -0.8781* 0.082 -0.8458* 0.057 -0.9273* 0.064 -0.8440* 0.059
Firm char acter istic
12. Employee num -0.0001* 0.060 -0.0004* 0.084 -0.0004* 0.070 -0.0003 0.125
Manage ment  char acte ristics
13.  MBM tenure -0.0885*** 0.000 -0.0936*** 0.000 -0.0916*** 0.000 -0.0943*** 0.000
14. MBM age -0.0349*** 0.003 -0.0277*** 0.008 -0.0328*** 0.003 -0.0282*** 0.008
15. MBM turnover 0.2694 0.184 0.4213** 0.025 0.2722 0.174 0.4247** 0.021
Prob›  chi2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R 2 0.2884 0.2210 0.2790 0.2140
Table 5: Probit regression on CEO turnover – ownership change 
    * coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 10% level; 
  ** coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 5% level ; 
*** coeffi  cients statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. 
Source: questionnaire data and own calculations
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